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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate the appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-2a-3(2)(g).
STATEMENT OF ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
Statement of Issue.
Was it incorrect for the trial court to deny Penman's request to withdraw his guilty plea
in light of the fact that he did not understand the nature and elements of the crime when he
entered his no contest plea, was denied effective assistance of counsel at his preliminary hearing,
and was not informed of the existence of exculpatory evidence.
Standard of Review.
Clear abuse of discretion. State v. Vasilacopulos. 756 P.2d 92, 93 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Statement of Issue.
Whether the State lost jurisdiction over the defendant by failing to bring defendant to
answer the criminal charges in accordance with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act.
Standard of Review.
Correctness, which "means the appellate court decides the matter for itself and does
not defer in any degree to the trial judge's determination of law." State v. Pena. 869 P.2d
932, 936 (Utah 1994).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.

This is an appeal from the ruling of the Third Judicial District Court's denial of
appellant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Pleas. The court's ruling which denied appellant's
motion was entered on August 12, 1992.
Appellant also challenges the lower court's lack of personal jurisdiction and subject
matter jurisdiction. See State in Interest of R.N.J.. 908 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)
("Jurisdictional issues may be raised for the first time on appeal.")
B.

Course of Proceedings and Disposition of the Case Below.

The action stems from Penman's October 28, 1988 no contest plea to manslaughter and
guilty plea to robbery. In June of 1989, acting pro se, Penman filed in the Third District
Court a Motion for Appointment of Counsel, Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, and Motion
In Forma Pauperis.
On June 27, 1991, Penman filed a writ of habeas corpus against the Utah State Board
of Pardons.

At the hearing, the Board of Pardons said the record was "unclear and

inconclusive."
On August 14, 1992, the Court denied appellant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea.
On September 1, 1992, Penman received a letter from his attorney, Mark Madsen,
informing him that he intended to withdraw as his attorney. Mr. Madsen withdrew during the
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time in which a notice of appeal should have been filed regarding Penman's motion to
withdraw his guilty plea. However, no notice of appeal was filed.
On April 29, 1994, Penman filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus. The Attorney
General's Office responded to Penman's habeas corpus request by filing a Motion for
Summary Judgment on the basis that appellant should be procedurally barred from raising
claims in a post-conviction proceeding that could have been raised on direct appeal.
On March 20, 1995, the Honorable William B. Bohling, after hearing oral argument,
granted the Motion for Summary Judgment by ruling that in spite of Penman's claim that his
counsel failed to comply with Rule 11 and in spite of the fact that Penman's previous attorney
failed to comply with Rule 4-604, Code of Judicial Administration, Penman was nonetheless
not prejudiced thereby.
In an unpublished opinion, the Court of Appeals reversed Judge Bohling's decision and
ordered reentry of the lower court's August 14, 1992 denial of Penman's motion to withdraw
his guilty plea in order to permit Penman his appeal of first right. This appeal now ensues.
C.

Factual Background.

1.

Roger Eugene Penman ("Penman") was originally charged in January 1988 of

committing second degree felony homicide, aggravated robbery, aggravated burglary and two
counts of theft stemming from a robbery/homicide which allegedly occurred on or about
November 1, 1987 at 111 South Allen Street, Midvale, Utah, wherein the victim of an
apparent robbery, Spencer Nielson, was shot and killed. (R. 5 and 77.)
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2.

Between the dates of November 1, 1987 and November 14, 1987, two juvenile

suspects suspected of committing the crimes were arrested by detectives of the Midvale Police
Department. These juveniles subsequently confessed and were thereby charged with first
degree felony murder and incarcerated pending certification as adults. (R. 5 and 78.)
3.

At approximately the same time that the certification proceedings were pending

against the juveniles, a high-speed chase occurred between Green River, Wyoming and
Rawlins, Wyoming. Arrested pursuant to that chase, was Monte Dean "Bo" Johnston
(subsequently Penman's accuser) and Penman. A third individual, Wendall Devon Baer who
had eluded authorities, was arrested in Craig, Colorado, made bail and has not been seen
since. (R. 5-6 and 78.)
4.

Subsequently, Wyoming authorities recovered from both Johnston's and

Penman's vehicles, oriental artifacts similar to those taken from the Nielson residence.
Furthermore, 20-gauge shotgun shells were recovered from both Johnston's truck as well as
Penman's jacket pockets. (R. 6 and 78.)
5.

On or about December 18, 1987, Monte Johnston telephoned Detective Stark

of the Midvale Police Department (the same detective who coerced the juveniles' confessions).
Johnston indicated to Detective Stark that Johnston would provide information on two
homicides in Utah, specifically that of Spencer Nielson as well as another (the latter,
Johnston's landlord Mr. John Poff), in exchange for favorable treatment, i.e., amnesty. (R. 6
and 78.)
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6.

At this time, and based upon the erroneous charges against, and the coerced

confessions from the two juveniles by the Midvale Police, the case was transferred to the Salt
Lake County Sheriffs Department. Prior to said transfer, however, Detective Stark received
an immunity agreement from Mr. Walter "Bud" Ellett (of the Salt Lake County Attorney's
office) for Johnston. (R. 6, 7 and 78.)
7.

By this time appellant had been returned to the State of Nevada on allegations

regarding a violation of his probation. During Penman's incarceration in Nevada, charges
were filed against him on the basis of Johnston's unsworn statements. Whereupon, Penman
filed for a 180-day disposition of detainers under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act
and on or about April 4, 1988 was returned to the State of Utah. (Copies of the Interstate
Agreement on Detainers are on file with the Nevada State Prison Records Department, the
States of Nevada and Utah, the Utah County Attorney's Office, as well as the Utah Public
Defenders Association.) (R. 7 and 78.)
8.

Subsequently, detectives Stark and Jerry Thompson went to Green River,

Wyoming to interview Johnston. In the course of that interview, Johnston indicated how
Penman, Wendall Devon Baer, State's witness Rick Lewis (Baer's brother) and Johnston had
gone to the Nielson residence on Halloween night (on early morning November 1, 1987). All
were allegedly armed. Johnston alleged Penman possessed a 20-gauge shotgun. Johnston
further described the theft of the oriental artifacts. He also alleged that he and Penman
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reentered the Nielson residence whereupon Penman shot and killed Mr. Nielson with a 20gauge shotgun. (R. 7, 8 and 79.)
9.

Further, and during the interview with Johnston and Detectives Thompson and

Stark, Johnston told of a murder of another individual named John Poff. He described in
detail the location of Mr. Poff s body, refrained from informing the detectives that Mr. Poff
was his [Johnston's] landlord and further withheld facts regarding Mr. Poff s death. (R. 9 and
79.)
10.

Additionally, Johnston not only admits to lying in his five unsworn statements

but Johnston also has a Utah arrest record for giving police false information. (R. 9.)
11.

Another individual detained by the police was Rick Lewis a.k.a. Kevin Baer.

He either desired or was induced to cooperate with authorities in exchange for reduced charges
and/or immunity. Subsequently, a sworn statement taken from Mr. Lewis by the Prosecuting
Attorney on February 4, 1988 implicated Penman in the robbery, burglary and theft charges,
but substantially conflicted on other issues including who actually committed the homicide.
Lewis was then held in the Salt Lake County Jail on a material witness warrant where it was
later discovered that Lewis was also known as Kevin Baer, brother of Penman's co-defendant
Wendall Devon Baer, and further, that he had an outstanding fugitive from justice warrant
regarding a commitment to the Ohio State Penitentiary. A subsequent polygraph indicated
truthfulness on Lewis' part. (R. 10 and 80.)
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12.

Lewis remained in the Salt Lake County Jail while Johnston supposedly

remained in jail in Green River, Wyoming. Johnston pleaded guilty in Wyoming on felony
eluding charges and was placed on probation by Wyoming authorities. (R. 10 and 80.)
13.

It was made clear to both Lewis (a.k.a. Baer) and Johnston that any violation

of their agreements to testify would result in full prosecution of all charges. (R. 11 and 80.)
14.

Shortly before Penman's preliminary hearing and prior to being served a

subpoena. Johnston absconded and to the best of appellant's knowledge has not been apprehended. Moreover, no warrant for Johnston's arrest was issued by the State of Utah. (R. 11
and 80.)
15.

Prior to his preliminary hearing, Penman was appointed counsel Francis

Palacios of the Salt Lake Public Defenders Association to represent him. (R. 11.)
16.

During Penman's preliminary hearing, the Prosecuting Attorney improperly

induced a stipulation from defense counsel that Johnston had been served with a subpoena to
appear in court. (R. 12.)
17.

Further, the Prosecuting Attorney apparently elicited false and/or perjured

testimony from State's witness Rick Lewis, allowed that testimony to go uncorrected, and
failed to disclose the State's grant of immunity to Lewis in exchange for his testimony.
(R. 12.)
18.

Defense counsel knew or should have known these facts. If she knew of them,

then her actions are tantamount to collusion with the state prosecutor by entering into a
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fraudulent stipulation with him and by failing to inform the court that Johnston had not been
subpoenaed. Moreover, defense counsel knew or should have known the nature of State's
witness Rick Lewis' false and perjured testimony as well as the nature of his immunity
agreement. Again, if she knew of these facts yet allowed the court and the defendant to be
fraudulently misled, she essentially acted in collusion with the State prosecution, resulting or
otherwise rising to the level of conflict of interest. Likewise, if Penman's counsel failed to
learn the full nature of these facts then, simply, her performance as counsel was ineffective
and her performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. (R. 13.)
19.

Additionally, Penman's defense counsel failed to inform Penman that motions

to suppress Johnston's inculpatory statements could be filed, failed to make any attempt to
insure Johnston's presence at the preliminary hearing, and failed to attempt to impeach State's
witness Rick Lewis (the only witness placing Penman at the scene of the crime) even though
Lewis made false and perjured testimony on the stand at Penman's preliminary hearing.
(R. 222.)
20.

Moreover, during the time of Penman's arrest up to the date of the entrance of

Penman's pleas, and on the advice of counsel, under the false premise that efforts were being
made to locate his accuser (Monte Johnston) and that preparations were being made on his
behalf and in his defense, waived his fast and speedy trial rights as mandated under the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act, Articles IV (c) and VI (a), as well as the Utah and
United States Constitutions. (R. 14-15.)
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21.

On October 28, 1988, Penman, a layman unskilled in the law, not knowing the

nature of the foregoing and on the advice of counsel, entered a no-contest plea to manslaughter
and guilty plea to robbery. (R. 15.)
22.

Penman is now in possession of documents that corroborate all of the above

allegations, including:
(a)

results of a ballistics test from the Washington, D.C. FBI Laboratory
which was compiled on August 12, 1988, six weeks before he entered
his pleas;

(b)

documents (a sheriffs report as well as a February 4, 1988 sworn statement between the prosecutor and Lewis) which establish ulterior motives
for State's witness Rick Lewis to testify;

(c)

a court minute entry verifying that Johnston was not served a subpoena;

(d)

verification from the Salt Lake Public Defender's Office that no warrant
has been issued by the State of Utah for the arrest of Johnston.

(R. 225 and 226.)
23.

Penman's no contest plea was not based on his admission of guilt in this matter,

but (in addition to misinformation) upon his fear of receiving life imprisonment if he pled not
guilty and was forced to defend himself against Lewis and Johnston's testimony. (R. 222.)
24.

At Penman's plea hearing, Rule 11 was not strictly complied with and Penman

did not understand the elements of the crimes to which he pled No Contest. Page 7 of the plea
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hearing transcript makes the only mention of Appellant's understanding of the elements of the
crime as follows:
And you understand the elements of both of those charges. Now,
what is your plea, then, to robbery, count 2 Robbery, Second
Degree?
(R. 16 and 58.)
25.

Penman's pleas entered October 28, 1988 were entered unknowingly and

involuntarily. He was not sufficiently informed of the elements of the crimes by the court,
the prosecutor or defense counsel. He was not informed that he was admitting to the act of
killing or to being an accessory to murder. Moreover, the facts that set forth the factual basis
of the charge for which he entered his plea misled him. Therefore, he did not realize the
actual conduct within the charge of which he now stands convicted. (R. 27.)
26.

If Penman had understood the nature of the charges against him, and likewise

had he been aware of the fact that Johnston had not been subpoenaed (as represented by the
prosecutor), or if he had been informed of the immunity agreement provided to the State's
witness, Lewis, or if he had knowledge of the withheld ballistics tests, he would not have
entered the plea in question but, rather, would have maintained his plea of not guilty.
(R. 222-223.)
27.

Post conviction, Penman has been treated by the parole board as the actual

perpetrator of the homicide and/or as an aider and abettor of the same. Had Penman been
informed by the court that his pleas would result in his being treated as a murderer or an
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accomplice in the act of murder, he would not have entered the pleas in question but, in the
alternative, he would have exercised his right of trial by jury. (R. 223.)
28.

After his return from the Nevada State Prison to the Utah State Prison and in

August of 1989, Penman's Commitment Order was amended in his absence, striking a plea
of guilty to criminal homicide manslaughter to reflect a no contest plea to that charge.
(R. 224.)
29.

In June 1990, acting pro se and after repeated failed attempts to seek assistance

from the attorneys of record, Penman filed in the Third District Court a Motion for
Appointment of Counsel, Motion to Withdraw Pleas, and Motion In Forma Pauperis. On
July 9, 1990, Penman was brought before Judge Rokich of the Third District Court During
this proceeding, his Motion to Withdraw Pleas was not heard, but his Motion for Appointment
of Counsel was granted. (R. 25 and 224.)
30.

On August 14, 1992, the court denied appellant's Motion to Withdraw Guilty

Plea. (R. 23.)
31.

At the time the court ruled on the Motion to Withdraw Guilty Plea, Penman's

attorney withdrew as counsel and failed to file an appeal. The Court of Appeals has ruled that
Mr. Madsen's withdrawal was inappropriate and has allowed Penman to file this appeal.
(R. 23 and 339.)
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32.

In May 1994, Penman received newly discovered evidence in regards to this

case which was released to him from the Utah Board of Pardons through the Labrum1
disclosure requirements, of which he did not have previous knowledge. (R. 225 and 226.)
33.

The documents released to him disclosed information of exculpatory nature in

regards to ballistic tests conducted by the Washington, D.C. FBI Criminal laboratory as early
as August 12, 1988, two months prior to the entrance of his pleas. (R. 226.)
34.

The documents also disclose information regarding ulterior motives for the

State's witness Rick Lewis to testify; that indeed Lewis had an immunity agreement with the
State; that the State failed to disclose these facts; and that Lewis had perjured himself while
under oath. All these facts were previously unknown and undisclosed to Penman. (R. 226).
35.

It was not until September 24, 1993 that Judge Rokich released documentation

from his court verifying that a subpoena was not served on State's witness Monte Bo Johnston.
(R. 226.)
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
A.

Penman Did Not Understand the Nature and Elements of the Offenses
When He Entered His No Contest Pleas.

Both guilty and no contest pleas must be entered in strict compliance with Rule 11,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. The burden of ensuring that such compliance exists is
placed on the trial courts.

'Labrum v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons. 870 P.2d 902 (Utah 1993).
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Penman did not understand the nature and elements of the offenses and his pleas.
Furthermore, the trial court failed to cover each element and ensure that Penman understood
such elements. The Utah Supreme Court has held that this type of plea colloquy is improper.
The record in this case is devoid of the basic elements regarding the Court's duty to ensure
compliance with Rule 11. Therefore, Penman was never accorded real notice of the true
nature of the charges against him.
B.

Penman Was Denied Effective Assistance of Counsel at His Preliminary
Hearing.

Prejudice may be shown by establishing that but for counsel's deficient performance,
a reasonable probability exists that the defendant would not have pleaded no contest. Penman
was denied effective assistance of counsel during the time of his preliminary hearing, during
the preparation and investigation phases of his case, and during the proceedings when he
entered his pleas. Penman maintains that his defense counsel provided ineffective assistance,
and/or acted in collusion with the state prosecution, in violation of Penman's rights. Such
improper actions by Penman's counsel and the prosecuting attorney establish grounds for
granting Penman's request for an evidentiary hearing.
C.

Penman Would Not Have Pled No Contest Had He Known of the
Additional Exculpatory Evidence.

Failure to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant who specifically requests such
evidence violates that defendant's due process. Since entering his no contest plea, Penman
has discovered several important items of evidence which, had he been aware of when he
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entered his plea, he would not have pled no contest. Such evidence includes: (1) results of
a ballistics test that was exculpatory in nature; (2) documents which establish ulterior motives
for the State's witness, Rick Lewis, to testify; that Lewis had an immunity agreement with the
State; that the State failed to disclose these facts; and that Lewis perjured himself while under
oath; and (3) documents establishing that a subpoena was not served on a State's witness,
Monte Bo Johnston.
D.

The State Lost Jurisdiction over the Defendant When It Failed to Bring
Penman to Answer the Criminal Charges in Accordance with the
Interstate Agreement on Detainers.

The state court lost jurisdiction over Penman by exceeding the time restraints
articulated under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act. In accordance with the Articles
under the Act, the charges should have been dismissed against Penman, with prejudice.

ARGUMENT
I.

PENMAN DID NOT UNDERSTAND THE NATURE AND
ELEMENTS OF THE OFFENSES WHEN HE ENTERED HIS NO
CONTEST PLEAS.

Both guilty and no contest pleas must be entered in strict compliance with Rule 11,
Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. State v. Smith. 812 P.2d 470, 473 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
"Rule 11(e) squarely places on trial courts the burden of ensuring that constitutional and Rule
11(e) requirements are complied with when a guilty plea is entered." State v. Gibbons. 740
P.2d 1309, 1312 (Utah 1987).

U

[A] trial court's failure to strictly comply with Rule 11 in
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accepting a guilty or no contest plea constitutes good cause, as a matter of law, for the withdrawal of that plea." State v. Smith. 812 P.2d at 476.
Strict Rule 11 compliance must be demonstrated on the record at the time the guilty or
no contest plea is entered.2 State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d 1309, 1313 (Utah 1987). The strict
compliance analysis is based on whether the plea affidavit and the colloquy with the court,
taken together, demonstrate strict Rule 11 compliance. State v. Smith. 812 P.2d at 477.
Rule 11(5) states in relevant part:
The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty or no contest, and may
not accept the plea until the court has found:

(b)

the plea is voluntarily made;

(c)
the defendant knows he has rights against compulsory selfincrimination, to a jury trial, and to confront and cross-examine in open court
the witnesses against him, and that by entering the plea he waives all of those
rights.
(d)
the defendant understands the nature and elements of the
offense to which he is entering the plea: that upon trial the prosecution would
have the burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt;
and that the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(Emphasis added.)

2

For purposes of Rule 11(5), a no contest plea is treated the same as a guilty plea. Rule 11 was
renumbered and slightly altered in 1993.
-15-

Because of the importance of compliance with Rule 11, the law places the burden of
establishing compliance with those requirements on the trial court. State v. Gibbons. 740 P.2d
at 1313.
Penman did not understand the nature and elements of the offenses and his pleas.
Moreover, Penman signed plea affidavits for both of the charged offenses before the trial court
at a preliminary hearing on October 28, 1988. The Court in Gibbons recognized that "to
make a knowing guilty plea, the defendant must understand the elements of the crimes charged
and the relationship of the law to the facts." 740 P.2d at 1312.
Penman pled "no contest" to the charge of manslaughter. Penman's manslaughter plea
affidavit sets forth the elements and facts relative to the manslaughter count as follows:
Elements: That the defendant, as a party to the offense, recklessly caused the
death of another.
(R. 56.)
Facts: On October 31, 1987 at 111 South Allen Street, Midvale, Utah, the
defendant was a party to a robbery, during the commission of which the victim
of that robbery, Spencer Nielson, was killed.
(R. 56-57.)
On October 28, 1988, when Penman entered his plea, the Court merely read the
elements and facts of the offense as they appeared on the plea affidavit, to the prosecuting
attorney, but did not engage Penman in a colloquy regarding the elements. Then after similarly reading the facts and elements of the robbery charge, the Court at page 7 of the plea
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transcript made the only mention of Penman's understanding of the elements of the crime as
follows:
THE COURT:

AND YOU UNDERSTAND THE ELEMENTS OF BOTH
OF THOSE CHARGES. NOW, WHAT IS YOUR PLEA,
THEN, TO ROBBERY, COUNT 2, ROBBERY, SECOND
DEGREE?

THE DEFENDANT:

THAT WOULD BE GUILTY YOUR HONOR.

(R. 58.)
The court then went on to inquire of the defendant on Page 7 of the plea transcript:
THE COURT:

. . . ARE YOU ENTERING A PLEA BECAUSE
YOU DID, IN FACT, COMMIT THE ROBBERY?

THE DEFENDANT:

YES. I W A S A PARTY TO THE OFFENSE OF
ROBBERY; YES, YOUR HONOR.

(R. 58.)
It is easy to see how an ill-advised, unskilled layman misconstrued the terminology of
"party to the offense of a robbery" to encompass "as a party to the offense" and improperly
(unknowingly) entered a plea to a criminal manslaughter offense that ambiguously represents
defendant's conduct as "a party to the offense of robbery during the commission of which, the
victim of that robbery . . . was killed."
It is exactly this type of uncertainty and ambiguity that a proper plea colloquy, when
undertaken, is intended to avoid. The court, by omission, failed to inform appellant that he
was admitting to the act of killing or to being an accessory to murder. In fact, the record is
silent with respect to the crime of murder and the transcript reveals no dialogue between the
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court and the defendant pertaining to the fact that defendant's plea would be an admission of
those elements.
In State v. Abeyta. 852 P.2d 993 (Utah 1993), the Utah Supreme Court held that this
type of plea colloquy is improper. LdL. at 995. In Abeyta, as in this case, the judge failed to
discuss the elements of the crimes with the defendant. The record in the instant case is devoid
of these basic elements as appellant was never accorded real notice of the true nature of the
charge against him. The trial court failed to personally establish that defendant's guilty plea
was knowing and voluntary and that appellant understood the elements of the crime. The
record reveals that the court made the only mention of Penman's understanding of the
elements as follows: "And you understand the elements of both of those charges. . . . "
(R. 16 and 26.)
In this case, there was no specific inquiry regarding the elements of the charges.
Penman's understanding of the elements was apparently taken for granted when in fact
Penman clearly did not understand the charges. At no time prior to the Court accepting his
plea did Penman understand that he was admitting to causing the death of Spencer Nielson.
In fact, Paragraph 9 of the plea affidavit further ambiguously represents that:
OTHER AGREEMENTS OF THIS PLEA NEGOTIATION INCLUDE . . .
that a letter will be sent by the State to the Board of Pardons addressing the
State's inability to prove Mr. Penman as the actual perpetrator of the homicide.
(R. 43.)
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In Penman, like Abeyta. the record merely reflects the court's inquiry as to whether
counsel, not the defendant, was satisfied that the elements recited in the plea affidavit
constituted the elements of the offenses.
In this case, the prosecutor stated that he was satisfied that the plea affidavit listed the
elements necessary to support the charges as follows:
THE COURT:

OKAY. NOW, COUNSEL. WITH REGARD TO THE
ELEMENTS OF THE CRIMINAL HOMICIDE,
MANSLAUGHTER, THAT THE DEFENDANT, AS A
PARTY TO THE OFFENSE, RECKLESSLY CAUSED
THE DEATH OF ANOTHER; DOES THAT
CONSTITUTE THE ELEMENTS?

[COUNSEL]:

IT DOES, YOUR HONOR.

(R. 56. Emphasis added.)
Simply, the trial court failed to clarify the foregoing as omissions, as well as the
ambiguities evident in the plea colloquy and plea affidavits with the defendant. As stated by
Justice Stewart in Abeyta. "[a]ny omissions or ambiguities in the [plea] affidavit must be
clarified during the plea hearing." 852 P.2d at 996.
The court then signed the affidavits without informing Penman of the elements of the
offenses which the state had the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt. Clearly,
Penman was not questioned regarding his homicide plea to the proper degree. As a result, his
due process rights have been denied.
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II.

PENMAN WAS DENIED THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT OF
REPRESENTATION AS WELL AS THE SUBSTANTIAL RIGHT OF
PRELIMINARY EXAMINATION.

In the context of a guilty plea, a defendant can establish prejudice by demonstrating that
but for counsel's deficient performance a reasonable probability exists that the defendant
would not have pleaded guilty. See, Hill v. Lockhart 474 U.S. 52, 59 (1985). Penman was
denied the constitutional right of representation as well as the substantial right of preliminary
examination into the charges. Penman was also denied effective assistance of counsel during
the preparation and investigation phases of his case and during the proceedings wherein he
entered his pleas and was sentenced by the court.
Penman maintains that his defense counsel acted in collusion with the state prosecutor
by entering into a fraudulent stipulation with the prosecutor and by failing to inform the court
that Johnston had not been subpoenaed. Moreover, Penman's court-appointed attorney knew
or should have known the nature of State's witness Rick Lewis' false and perjured testimony
as well as the nature of his immunity agreement. If Penman's attorney knew of these facts,
she allowed the court and the defendant to be misled, making her actions tantamount to
collusion with the state prosecutor, resulting or otherwise rising to the level of conflict of
interest. Likewise, if Penman's attorney failed to learn the full nature of these facts, her
performance simply fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. (R. 13.) See.
Strickland v. Washington. 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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Penman's situation is deserving of reversal because not only did Penman misunderstand
the effects of his plea due to the lack of explanation, but Penman has also been prejudiced by
the actions of his counsel and the fact that he was not made aware of additional exculpatory
and/or impeachment evidence when he entered his guilty pleas. As a result, the fact-finding
process of the preliminary hearing and/or plea colloquy was so tainted by ineffective assistance
of counsel, collusion, prosecutorial misconduct or acts of subterfuge as to render those
proceedings devoid of any meaningful due process. This prevented the binding court from
fully and impartially determining the questions of law and fact relevant to the case, resulting
in the denial of a preliminary examination into the charges alleged against Penman, the
unknowing and involuntary entry of Penman's pleas, and ultimately the denial of Penman's
liberty without due process of law.
Because Penman was deprived of his substantial right of preliminary examination, the
pleas should be declared a nullity and the conviction vacated.

III.

PENMAN WOULD NOT HAVE PLED NO CONTEST HAD HE
KNOWN OF THE ADDITIONAL EXCULPATORY AND IMPEACHMENT EVIDENCE.

In Bradv v. Maryland. 373 U.S. 83, 86-89 (1963), the United States Supreme Court
held that the government's failure to disclose evidence favorable to a defendant who
specifically requested it violated defendant's due process rights. See Miller v. Angliker. 848
F.2d 1312, 1319-20 (2d Cir. 1988) (the Brady holding also applies to guilty pleas that are
affected by the government's nondisclosure of evidence).
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Since entering his no contest plea, Penman has discovered several important items of
evidence. If Penman had been aware of such evidence when he entered his plea, he would not
have pled no contest to the charges filed against him. Such evidence includes: 1) results of
a ballistics test that was exculpatory in nature; 2) documents which establish ulterior motives
for the State's witness, Rick Lewis, to testify, that Lewis had an immunity agreement with the
state, that the state failed to disclose these facts, and that Lewis perjured himself while under
oath; and 3) documents establishing that a subpoena was not served on State's witness Monte
Bo Johnston.
The aforementioned ballistics report was compiled on August 12, 1988, two months
before Penman entered his no contest pleas. Failure to disclose the existence of such a report,
in addition to other nondisclosures (set forth in Penman's Writ of Habeas Corpus) described
herein, sufficiently justify the remedies requested in Penman's petition.
Penman's pleas were not voluntary because they were based on false and misleading
information provided to the court and to Penman.
Monte "Bo" Johnston was the sole witness for the State identifying Penman as the
individual who shot Mr. Nielson. However, Mr. Johnston, who was given immunity by the
State, failed to appear at the preliminary hearing on June 16, 1988 and upon information and
belief is currently a fugitive from justice. The only remaining State's witness, Rick Lewis,
also a participant in the robbery, placed Penman at the scene but could not identify Penman
as the individual who shot Mr. Nielson. On the contrary, Mr. Lewis identified Mr. Johnston
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as the individual who physically abused Mr. Nielson and also said that he thought
Mr. Johnston was the individual who shot Mr. Nielson.
Furthermore, at the June 16, 1988 preliminary hearing, Mr. Lewis, the State's only
witness, lied under oath regarding any "deals" he had made in exchange for testifying. The
following questioning occurred there by the prosecutor:
Q

And have there been any promises as to what disposition that you will
personally have concerning the outcome of this case.

A

No.

Q

No one has mentioned that you will have charges filed, not have charges
filed or anything of that nature; is that correct?

A

That's right.

(R. 38.)
However, in a prior sworn statement by Mr. Lewis gave to the prosecutor on
February 4, 1988, the following colloquy occurred:
Q

If in the event that you do not make your daily call ins or for other
reasons you are picked up for other charges or for some reason we find
that your statement given today is not truthful statement, that all deals
are off. That you will then be filed on as a defendant in this matter and
that all statements previously given, excuse me, and that this statement
given now under oath will then be used against you. Is that understood?

A

Yes.

Q

Just to make it perfectly clear, Rick, everything you've told us is the
truth.
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A

Yes.

Q

If for some reason, as I stated before, you're not telling us the truth all
deals are off.

A

Uh huh (indicating affirmatively).

Q

Furthermore, not only all deals are off, we will file against you as a
defendant, charge you with murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated
burglary and two counts of theft and use this statement against you. Are
you aware of that?

A

Okay.

(R. 38-39, emphasis added.)
The sheriff's report (released by the Utah State Board of Pardons) relating the
following colloquy between sheriff's officer, Jerry Thompson, and the State's witness, Rick
Lewis, further revealed the extent of Lewis' deal with the State:
LEWIS:

I STILL HAVE NOT CHANGED MY MIND, I WILL KEEP
MY PART OF THE BARGAIN. I WILL TESTIFY AND
WILL DO EVERYTHING ELSE I TOLD YOU I WOULD.

Penman did not become aware of Mr. Lewis' untruthful statement regarding any
"deals," and corresponding issues regarding credibility, until some time after his conviction.
(R. 39.) At the time of entry of his pleas, Penman believed that both Mr. Johnston and
Mr. Lewis had turned State's witness and would be testifying against him. This was a significant factor in Penman's decision to enter into the plea agreements. Id,
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IV.

THE STATE LOST JURISDICTION OVER THE DEFENDANT WHEN
IT FAILED TO BRING PENMAN TO ANSWER THE CRIMINAL
CHARGES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE INTERSTATE AGREEMENT
ON DETAINERS.

During Penman's incarceration in Nevada, charges were filed against him by the State
of Utah on the basis of Johnston's unsworn statements. Whereupon, Penman filed for a 180day disposition of detainers under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act as contained in
Utah Code Ann., § 77-29-5. On or about April 4, 1988, he was extradited to the State of
Utah. (R. 7 and 78.) Once within the jurisdiction and custody of Utah authorities, the
Detainers Act authorizes and provides the State a 120-day prosecution period. If a final
disposition on the charges is not reached within that time (absent a waiver of the defendant)
the charges must be dismissed, with prejudice, and the defendant returned to the custody of
the sending state. See, Articles IV and VI of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act.
During the time of Penman's arrest up to the date of the entrance of his pleas, on the
advice of counsel, and under the false premise that efforts were being made to locate his
accuser (Monte Johnston), Penman involuntarily waived his rights under the Detainers Act.
(R. 14-15.)
In order to waive the rights accorded under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers,
Penman must knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily have chosen not to enjoy that right.
(See State v. Dastrup. 818 P.2d 594, 596 (Utah Ct. App. 1991); State v. Hoff. 814 P.2d
1119, 1122 (Utah 1991); Chess v. Smith. 617 P.2d 341, 344 (Utah 1980).
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Based upon the errors (due process violations) cited above and herein, which were
committed during the preliminary examination, Penman's waiver was involuntary and the
court was divested of jurisdiction of the defendant requiring dismissal of the charges, with
prejudice, as per the Detainers Act.3
In Utah, the "right of a preliminary examination . . . [is] a substantial one." State v.
Pay. 146 P. 300 (Utah 1915). Appellant submits that error committed during preliminary
examination is not harmless, if it renders the hearing inadequate. See Coleman v. Burnett,
477 F.2d 1187, 1195 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
The appellant was not originally bound over by the Circuit Court on the homicide
charge (see Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, if 20, p. 13, Penman v. Carver. No.
940903286HC) but was initially provided thirty days to brief the issue. This, taken in
conjunction with the fact that the prosecutor during the preliminary hearing failed to disclose
the State's grant of immunity to Lewis, suborned perjury from that witness concerning "deals"
the State had made with him in exchange for his testimony, allowed that testimony to go
uncorrected and misrepresented that appellant's accuser (Johnston) was subpoenaed to appear
in court (when in reality he was not) deprived appellant of his substantial right to a preliminary

3

A final disposition was not reached in the case until October 28, 1988, when Penman entered his
pleas, and November 28, 1988, when he was sentenced - a full 210 days post Penman's extradition
to Utah and three months past the expiration of the prosecution period authorized under the
Detainers Act.
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hearing into the charges. Additionally, it may have deprived him of the opportunity to show
that another and not the defendant committed the crime in question.
Had these facts been disclosed to appellant during the 30-day briefing period accorded
by the Circuit Court to brief the bind-over issue, these matters could and most probably would
have been presented to the Circuit Court at that time and on the defendant's behalf.
Because appellant was not accorded an adequate preliminary examination and was thus
not properly bound over to answer the criminal charges, the district court never acquired
jurisdiction over the defendant to accept the pleas in question; therefore, the conviction should
be vacated.
It was held in State v. Freeman. 71 P.2d 196, 200 (Utah 1937) that a district court does
not acquire jurisdiction over a defendant as a result of original complaint, but rather from the
binding over of the defendant by a magistrate. It stands to reason, therefore, that if the
preliminary hearing was not waived and the examination was tainted with error rendering that
proceeding inadequate, appellant incurred the loss of a substantial right of due process.
The trial court lost jurisdiction over appellant by exceeding the time restraints articulated under the Interstate Agreement on Detainers and the charges should have been dismissed
with prejudice in accordance with the articles under the Detainers Act.
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CONCLUSION
Penman asks this court to vacate his conviction and order his release from custody
and/or for any other relief deemed appropriate by this court that is not prejudicial to the
appellant.
DATED this /g> day of May, 1997.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU

Reed L./Martineau
Korey D. Rasmussen
Attorneys for Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 13th day of May, 1997, I caused two true and correct
copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF APPELLANT (Case No. 960639-CA, Utah Court of
Appeals) to be served upon the parties listed below by placing true and correct copies
thereof in an envelope and causing the same to be mailed first-class, postage prepaid, to:
James H. Beadles
Assistant Attorney General
Heber M. Wells Building
160 East 300 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84114

iorey D. Jrasmussen
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ADDENDUM

Rule 4-603

CODE OF JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION
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(2) The chair of the committee shall have experience in and knowledge of
the criminal justice system and shall have an interest in the rights of victims
and witnesses. The chair shall not be a member of the judiciary or be employed by the judicial branch of government.
(3) On or before September 1st of each odd-numbered year, the chair shall
appoint the members of the Victims' Rights Committee. Members shall consist of: a county attorney, a sheriff, a corrections field services administrator,
a juvenile court representative, an appointed victim advocate, a municipal
attorney, a municipal chief of police and other representatives as appropriate.
Members shall have experience in and knowledge of the criminal justice system and shall have an interest in the rights of victims and witnesses.
(4) The chair may succeed himself or herself at the discretion of the presiding judge. The members of the committee may succeed themselves at the
discretion of the chair.
(5) The Committee shall act as a clearinghouse to distribute and standardize information relevant to victims of crime and the services available to them
within the judicial district. It shall assume a leadership role in developing an
educational program for the public as well as professionals who provide services to victims. Victims who have complaints may submit them in writing to
the Committee. The Committee will note them for informational purposes and
then forward them to the appropriate agency for action. Minutes of the Committee meetings shall be forwarded to the Commission on Criminal and Juvenile Justice for distribution to local Committees on a statewide basis. The
Commission shall also provide minutes of the meetings of the Governor's
Council on Victims to the local Committees.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.)

Rule 4-603. Motions for reduction of offense at sentencing.
Intent:
To reduce delays in sentencing by providing the court and the prosecutor
prior notice of the filing of a motion to reduce a criminal offense pursuant to
Utah Code Ann. Section 76-3-402.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all trial courts of record and not of record.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Motions for a reduction of criminal offense pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
Section 76-3-402 shall be in writing and filed at least ten days prior to the
date of sentencing unless the court sets the date for sentencing within ten
days of the entry of conviction.
(2) The motion shall state the grounds for requesting the reduction of offense.
(3) A copy of the motion shall be sent to the prosecuting attorney to provide
the prosecutor with an opportunity to review the motion and respond to it at
or prior to the time of hearing.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990.)

Rule 4-604. Withdrawal of counsel in criminal and delinquency cases.
Intent:
To establish a uniform procedure for withdrawal of counsel in criminal
cases.
Applicability:
- ^ oVioii flnnlv to all trial courts of record and not of record.

Statement of the Rule:
(1) Withdrawal of counsel prior to entry of judgment.
(A) Consistent with the Rules of Professional Conduct, an attorney
may not withdraw as counsel of record in criminal cases without the
approval of the court.
(B) A motion to withdraw as an attorney in a criminal case shall be
made in open court with the defendant present unless otherwise ordered
by the court.
(2) Withdrawal of counsel after entry of judgment. Prior to permitting withdrawal of trial counsel, the trial court shall require counsel to file a written
statement certifying:
(A) That the defendant has been advised of the right to file a motion for
new trial or to seek a certificate of probable cause, and if in counsel's
opinion such action is appropriate, that the same has been filed.
(B) That the defendant has been advised of the right to appeal and if in
counsel's opinion such action is appropriate, that a Notice of Appeal, a
Request for Transcript, and in appropriate cases, an Affidavit of
Impecuniosity and an Order requiring the appropriate county to bear the
costs of preparing the transcript have been filed.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; March 31, 1992.)
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Cited in State v. Seel, 827 P.2d 954 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992).

Rule 4-605. Use of unpublished opinions in criminal cases.
Intent:
To establish a uniform standard for the use of unpublished opinions.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all courts of record and not of record.
Statement of the Rule:
Unpublished opinions, orders and judgments have no precedential value
and shall not be cited or used in the courts of this state, except for purposes of
applying the doctrine of the law of the case, res judicata, or collateral estoppel.
For the purposes of this rule, any memorandum decision, per curiam opinion,
or other disposition of the Court designated "not for official publication" shall
be regarded as an unpublished opinion.
(Added effective January 15, 1990; amended effective November 1, 1996.)
Amendment Notes. — The 1996 amendment added the last sentence.

Rule 4-606. Repealed.
Repeals. — Former Rule 4-606, providing
for the uniform recommended fine schedule,

was repealed effective March 31, 1992. For
present comparable provisions, see Rule 4-302.

Rule 4-607. Presentence investigation reports.
Intent:
To provide uniform guidelines and timeframes for the completion and delivery of presentence investigation reports.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the District and Justice Courts and the Department
of Corrections.

Rule 11

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

Additional time to plead.
Waiver of objections.
Additional time to plead.
Where original information did not state
public offense and was amended so as to state
public offense for first time, as amending information in larceny prosecution so as to allege
ownership of property alleged to have been stolen, it was equivalent of a new information requiring arraignment of defendant and his plea

thereto; and where defendant was not given
time to plead to such information, court com.
mitted reversible error. State v. Jensen, 83
U t a h 4 5 2 ) 30 p.2d 203 (1934).
Waiver of objections.
Subdivision (c) merely reaffirms the general
legal rule that all objections, including those to
proceedings in the circuit court, must be made
before a guilty plea is entered or the objections
will be waived. State v. Humphrey, 794 P.2d
496 (Utah Ct. App. 1990), rev'd on other
grounds, 823 P.2d 464 (Utah 1991).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Am. Jur. 2d. — 21 Am. Jur. 2d Criminal
Law §§ 433 to 438.
C.J.S. — 22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 355 et
seq.

Key Numbers. — Criminal Law *» 261(1),
263, 264.

Rule 11. Pleas.
(a) Upon arraignment, except for an infraction, a defendant shall be represented by counsel, unless the defendant waives counsel in open court. The
defendant shall not be required to plead until the defendant has had a reasonable time to confer with counsel.
(b) A defendant may plead not guilty, guilty, no contest, not guilty by
reason of insanity, or guilty and mentally ill. A defendant may plead in the
alternative not guilty or not guilty by reason of insanity. If a defendant refuses to plead or if a defendant corporation fails to appear, the court shall
enter a plea of not guilty.
(c) A defendant may plead no contest only with the consent of the court.
(d) When a defendant enters a plea of not guilty, the case shall forthwith be
set for trial. A defendant unable to make bail shall be given a preference for
an early trial. In cases other than felonies the court shall advise the defendant, or counsel, of the requirements for making a written demand for a jury
trial.
(e) The court may refuse to accept a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and
mentally ill, and may not accept the plea until the court has found:
(1) if the defendant is not represented by counsel, he or she has knowingly waived the right to counsel and does not desire counsel;
(2) the plea is voluntarily made;
(3) the defendant knows of the right to the presumption of innocence,
the right against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to a speedy
public trial before an impartial jury, the right to confront and cross-examine in open court the prosecution witnesses, the right to compel the attendance of defense witnesses, and that by entering the plea, these rights are
waived;
(4) the defendant understands the nature and elements of the offense to
which the plea is entered, that upon trial the prosecution would have the
burden of proving each of those elements beyond a reasonable doubt, and
that the plea is an admission of all those elements;
(5) the defendant knows the minimum and maximum sentence, and if
applicable, the minimum mandatory nature of the minimum sentence,
that may be imposed for each offense to which a plea is entered, including
the possibility of the imposition of consecutive sentences;
(6) if the tendered plea is a result of a prior plea discussion and plea
agreement, and if so, what agreement has been reached;
(7) the defendant has been advised of the time limits for filing any
motion to withdraw the plea; and
(8) the defendant has been advised that the right of appeal is limited.

UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE

Rule 11

ff) Failure to advise the defendant of the time limits for filing any motion to
i-iibdraw a plea of guilty, no contest or guilty and mentally ill is not a ground
f£r setting the plea aside, but may be the ground for extending the time to
iEtke a motion under Section 77-13-6.
^ f e ) (1) If it appears that the prosecuting attorney or any other party has
agreed to request or recommend the acceptance of a plea to a lesser included offense, or the dismissal of other charges, the agreement shall be
approved by the court.
(2) If sentencing recommendations are allowed by the court, the court
shall advise the defendant personally that any recommendation as to
sentence is not binding on the court,
(h) (1) The judge shall not participate in plea discussions prior to any plea
agreement being made by the prosecuting attorney.
(2) When a tentative plea agreement has been reached, the judge, upon
request of the parties, may permit the disclosure of the tentative agreement and the reasons for it, in advance of the time for tender of the plea.
The judge may then indicate to the prosecuting attorney and defense
counsel whether the proposed disposition will be approved.
(3) If the judge then decides that final disposition should not be in
conformity with the plea agreement, the judge shall advise the defendant
and then call upon the defendant to either affirm or withdraw the plea.
(i) With approval of the court and the consent of the prosecution, a defendant may enter a conditional plea of guilty, guilty and mentally ill, or no
|«mtest, reserving in the record the right, on appeal from the judgment, to a
MWview of the adverse determination of any specified pre-trial motion. A defenfdant who prevails on appeal shall be allowed to withdraw the plea.
iff (j) When a defendant tenders a plea of guilty and mentally ill, in addition to
[Ihe other requirements of this rule, the court shall hold a hearing within a
reasonable time to determine if the defendant is mentally ill in accordance
With Utah Code Ann. § 77-16a-103.
(Amended effective May 1, 1993; January 1, 1996.)

i

Amendment Notes. — The 1993 amendritnt, effective May 1,1993, revised the subdi|jkfon designations, substituting letters for
pombers and vice versa; inserted "or guilty
find mentally ilT in the introductory parafjpPk m Subdivision (e) and in Subdivision (f);
Igjwte Subdivision (e)(3) to list more rights;
|lto&*rted "and if applicable, the minimum manijtiwy nature of the minimum sentence" in
[^division (e)(5); added Subdivision (e)(8); deiffed "that contemplates entry of a plea in the
*P*ctation that other charges will be dropped

or dismissed" after "has been reached" in Subdivision (h)(2); added Subdivision (i); and made
stylistic changes throughout the rule.
The 1996 amendment deleted "pursuant to
Rule 21.5"fromthe end of the first sentence in
Subdivision (b) and added Subdivision (j)«
Cross-References. — Inadmissibility of
pleas, plea discussions or related statements,
U.R.E. 410.
Time limit for filing motion to withdraw plea
of guilty or no contest, § 77-13-6.

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

pliance with rule.
' or no contest plea.
Qitional pleas.
planation sufficient,
ctual basis,
failure to explain.
^sequences of plea.
^Kature and elements of offense.
7-*ught against self-incrimination.
J^cial burden.
/°luntarine8s.
gHisence of finding.
•^Method of establishing.
uthdrawal.
" agreements.

—Refusal of court to comply.
—Sentencing.
Scope of review.
Cited.
Compliance with rule.
A trial court's failure to comply strictly with
this rule in accepting a guilty or no contest
plea is good cause, as a matter of law, for the
withdrawal of that plea. State v. Gibbons, 740
P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987); State v. Smith, 812
P.2d 470 (Utah Ct. App. 1991).
The strict compliance rule announced in
State v. Gibbons, 740 P.2d 1309 (Utah 1987)
was a clear break with the Supreme Court's
rulings in previous cases dealing with the validity of guilty pleas and should not be retroactively applied to guilty pleas taken before the

78-2a-3
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(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a presiding judge from
among the members of the court by majority vote of all judges. The term of
office of the presiding judge is two years and until a successor is elected. A
presiding judge of the Court of Appeals may serve in that office no more than
two successive terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for an acting
presiding judge to serve in the absence or incapacity of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the office of presiding judge by
majority vote of all judges of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of
a judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme Court and the Judicial
Council.
(5) Filing fees for the Court of Appeals are the same as for the Supreme
Court.
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-2, enacted by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 45; 1988, ch. 248, § 7.
NOTES TO DECISIONS
Stare decisis.
A rule of law pronounced by a panel of the
Court of Appeals governs all later cases involving the same legal issues decided by other

78-2a-3.

panels of that court and all courts of lower
rank. Renn v. Utah State Bd. of Pardons, 904
R2d 677 (Utah 1995).

Court of Appeals jurisdiction*

(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue all extraordinary writs and
to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders, and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction, including jurisdiction of
interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from formal adjudicative
proceedings of state agencies or appeals from the district court review of
informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public
Service Commission, State Tax Commission, School and Institutional
Trust Lands Board of Trustees, Division of Forestry, Fire and State Lands
actions reviewed by the executive director of the Department of Natural
Resources, Board of Oil, Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of political subdivisions of
the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) interlocutory appeals from any court of record in criminal cases,
except those involving a charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(e) appeals from a court of record in criminal cases, except those
involving a conviction of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by
persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence,
14
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except petitions constituting a challenge to a conviction of or the sentence
for a first degree or capital felony,
(g) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the Board of Pardons and Parole except in cases
involving a first degree or capital felony,
(h) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases,
including, but not limited to, divorce, annulment, property division, child
custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity,
(1) appeals from the Utah Military Court, and
(j) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals from the Supreme Court
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only and by the vote of four
judges of the court may certify to the Supreme Court for original appellate
review and determination any matter over which the Court of Appeals has
original appellate jurisdiction
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63,
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act, in its review of agency adjudicative proceedings
History: C. 1953, 78-2a-3, e n a c t e d by L.
1986, ch. 47, § 46; 1987, ch. 161, § 304; 1988,
ch. 73, § 1; 1988, ch. 210, § 141; 1988, ch.
248, § 8; 1990, ch. 80, § 5, 1990, ch. 224, § 3;
1991, ch. 268, § 22; 1992, ch. 127, § 12; 1994,
ch. 13, § 45; 1995, ch. 299, § 47; 1996, ch.
159, § 19; 1996, ch. 198, § 49.
A m e n d m e n t N o t e s . — The 1992 amend
ment, effective April 27 1992, added Subsec
tion (2)(h) and redesignated former Subsections
(2)(h) through (j) as Subsections (2)(i) through
(k)
The 1994 amendment, effective May 2, 1994,
substituted "Board of Pardons and Parole" for
"Board of Pardons" in Subsection (2)(h) and
inserted "Administrative Procedures Act" in
Subsection (4)
The 1995 amendment effective May 1, 1995
substituted "School and Institutional Trust

Lands Board of Tru^tee^ Division of Sovereign
Lands and Forestrv actions reviewed by the
executive director oi t i e Department of Natural
Resources for 'Boaia of State Lands in Subsection (2)(a)
The 1996 amendment bv ch 159 effective
July 1, 1996 substituted "Division of Forestry,
Fire and State Lana-~ for 'Division of Sover
eign Lands and Fore>trv in Subsection (2>(a)
The 1996 amendment by ch 198 effective
July 1 1996 deleted iormer Subsection (2)(d),
listing appeals from circuit courts and redesig
nated former Sub^ecnons (2)(e) to (2)(k as
(2)(d) to I2)(j)
This section is &et out as reconciled b\ the
Office of Legislative Research and General
Counsel
Cross-References — Composition and jurisdiction of militan court, §§ 39 6-15 39-6-16

NOTES TO DECISIONS
E x t r a o r d i n a r y writs.
The Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over a
petition for a writ of mandamus directed
against a judge of the district court based on its
authority under this section to enforce compliance with a prior order and to issue writs in aid
of its appellate jurisdiction Barnard v Murphy,
882 P 2 d 679 (Utah Ct App 1994)
The term "original" m § 78-2-2(2) adds nothing to the Supreme Court's writ jurisdiction —
and its absence in Subsection (1) takes nothing
from the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals —
because jurisdiction over petitions for extraordinary writs necessarily invokes a court's jurisdiction to consider a petition originally filed
with it as opposed to its appellate jurisdiction
over cases t h a t onginated elsewhere Barnard
v Murphy, 882 P2d 679 (Utah Ct App 1994)
Because, under this section, the Court of

ANALYSIS

Decisions of Board of Pardons
Extraordinary writs
Final order
Habeas corpus proceedings
Post-conviction review
Scope
— Sentence reduction
Cited
D e c i s i o n s of B o a r d of P a r d o n s .
The Court of Appeals hears appeals from
orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging decisions of the Board of Pardons, except when the petition additionally challenges
the conviction of or sentence for a first degree
felony or a capital felony Then the appeal is to
be heard by the Supreme Court Preece v
House, 886 P 2 d 508 (Utah 1994)
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77-29-3. Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persons*
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any person while adjudged
to be incompetent to proceed under Chapter 15.
History: C. 1953, 77-29-3, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-29-4. Escape of prisoner voids demand.
Escape from custody by a prisoner after delivery of the written demand
referred to in Subsection 77-29-1(1) shall void the request.
History: C. 1953, 77-29-4, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment
into law — Text of agreement.
The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby enacted into law and
entered into by this state with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in
the form substantially as follows:
The contracting states solemnly agree that:
ARTICLE I
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers
based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in
securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions,
produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and
rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose
of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such
charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based
on untried indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also find
that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of
co-operative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide
such co-operative procedures.
ARTICLE II
As used in this agreement:
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States of
America; a territory or possession of the United States; District of
Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcerated at the time that he initiates a request for final dispositions pursuant
to Article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availability
is initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof.
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had on
an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or Article
IV hereof.
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ARTICLE III
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a Den*l
or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the contin!
uance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state
any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which m
detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial
within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting
officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written
notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition
to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good
cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court
having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable
continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate
of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served,
the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time
earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the
state parole agency relating to the prisoner.
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in
paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden,
commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall
promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody
of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any
detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his right to make a
request for final disposition of the indictment, information or complaint on
which the detainer is based.
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to
paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all
untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which
detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose
prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed. The
warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of the
prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and courts
in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner's request for
final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner.
Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be accompanied by
copies of the prisoner's written notice, request, and the certificate. If trial is not
had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to
the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such
indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect,
and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to a
paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with
respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein
by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to the receiving
state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after completion of his
term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request for final disposition
shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the production of his body in
any court where his presence may be required in order to effectuate the
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77-29-3* Chapter inapplicable to incompetent persons.
The provisions of this chapter shall not apply to any person while adjudged
to be incompetent to proceed under Chapter 15.
History: C. 1953, 77-29-3, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-29-4. Escape of prisoner voids demand.
Escape from custody by a prisoner after delivery of the written demand
referred to in Subsection 77-29-1(1) shall void the request.
History: C. 1953, 77-29-4, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.

77-29-5. Interstate agreement on detainers — Enactment
into law — Text of agreement.
The interstate agreement on detainers is hereby enacted into law and
entered into by this state with all other jurisdictions legally joining therein in
the form substantially as follows:
The contracting states solemnly agree that:
ARTICLE I
The party states find that charges outstanding against a prisoner, detainers
based on untried indictments, informations or complaints, and difficulties in
securing speedy trial of persons already incarcerated in other jurisdictions,
produce uncertainties which obstruct programs of prisoner treatment and
rehabilitation. Accordingly, it is the policy of the party states and the purpose
of this agreement to encourage the expeditious and orderly disposition of such
charges and determination of the proper status of any and all detainers based
on untried indictments, informations or complaints. The party states also find
that proceedings with reference to such charges and detainers, when emanating from another jurisdiction, cannot properly be had in the absence of
co-operative procedures. It is the further purpose of this agreement to provide
such co-operative procedures.
ARTICLE II
As used in this agreement:
(a) "State" shall mean a state of the United States; the United States of
America; a territory or possession of the United States; District of
Columbia; the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
(b) "Sending state" shall mean a state in which a prisoner is incarcerated at the time that he initiates a request for final dispositions pursuant
to Article III hereof or at the time that a request for custody or availability
is initiated pursuant to Article IV hereof.
(c) "Receiving state" shall mean the state in which trial is to be had on
an indictment, information or complaint pursuant to Article III or Article
IV hereof.
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ARTICLE III
(a) Whenever a person has entered upon a term of imprisonment in a Den*!
or correctional institution of a party state, and whenever during the conKn!
uance of the term of imprisonment there is pending in any other party state
any untried indictment, information or complaint on the basis of which m
detainer has been lodged against the prisoner, he shall be brought to trial
within 180 days after he shall have caused to be delivered to the prosecuting
officer and the appropriate court of the prosecuting officer's jurisdiction written
notice of the place of his imprisonment and his request for a final disposition
to be made of the indictment, information or complaint; provided that for good
cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his counsel being present, the court
having jurisdiction of the matter may grant any necessary or reasonable
continuance. The request of the prisoner shall be accompanied by a certificate
of the appropriate official having custody of the prisoner, stating the term of
commitment under which the prisoner is being held, the time already served,
the time remaining to be served on the sentence, the amount of good time
earned, the time of parole eligibility of the prisoner, and any decisions of the
state parole agency relating to the prisoner.
(b) The written notice and request for final disposition referred to in
paragraph (a) hereof shall be given or sent by the prisoner to the warden,
commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of him, who shall
promptly forward it together with the certificate to the appropriate prosecuting official and court by registered or certified mail, return receipt requested.
(c) The warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody
of the prisoner shall promptly inform him of the source and contents of any
detainer lodged against him and shall also inform him of his right to make a
request for final disposition of the indictment, information or complaint on
which the detainer is based.
(d) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to
paragraph (a) hereof shall operate as a request for final disposition of all
untried indictments, informations or complaints on the basis of which
detainers have been lodged against the prisoner from the state to whose
prosecuting official the request for final disposition is specifically directed. The
warden, commissioner of corrections or other official having custody of the
prisoner shall forthwith notify all appropriate prosecuting officers and courts
in the several jurisdictions within the state to which the prisoner's request for
final disposition is being sent of the proceeding being initiated by the prisoner.
Any notification sent pursuant to this paragraph shall be accompanied by
copies of the prisoner's written notice, request, and the certificate. If trial is not
had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to
the return of the prisoner to the original place of imprisonment, such
indictment, information or complaint shall not be of any further force or effect,
and the court shall enter an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
(e) Any request for final disposition made by a prisoner pursuant to a.
paragraph (a) hereof shall also be deemed to be a waiver of extradition with
respect to any charge or proceeding contemplated thereby or included therein
by reason of paragraph (d) hereof, and a waiver of extradition to the receiving
state to serve any sentence there imposed upon him, after completion of his
term of imprisonment in the sending state. The request for final disposition
shall also constitute a consent by the prisoner to the production of his body in
any court where his presence may be required in order to effectuate the
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purposes of this agreement and a further consent voluntarily to be returned to
the original place of imprisonment in accordance with the provisions of this
agreement. Nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the imposition of a
concurrent sentence if otherwise permitted by law.
(f) Escape from custody by the prisoner subsequent to his execution of the
request for final disposition referred to in paragraph (a) hereof shall void the
request.
ARTICLE IV
(a) The appropriate officer of the jurisdiction in which an untried indictment, information or complaint is pending shall be entitled to have a prisoner
against whom he has lodged a detainer and who is serving a term of
imprisonment in any party state made available in accordance with Article
V(a) hereof upon presentation of a written request for temporary custody or
availability to the appropriate authorities of the state in which the prisoner is
incarcerated; provided that the court having jurisdiction of such indictment,
information or complaint shall have duly approved, recorded and transmitted
the request; and provided further that there shall be a period of 30 days after
receipt by the appropriate authorities before the request be honored, within
which period the governor of the sending state may disapprove the request for
temporary custody or availability, either upon his own motion or upon motion
of the prisoner.
(b) Upon receipt of the officer's written request as provided in paragraph (a)
hereof, the appropriate authorities having the prisoner in custody shall furnish
the officer with a certificate stating the term of commitment under which the
prisoner is being held, the time already served, the time remaining to be served
on the sentence, the amount of good time earned, the time of parole eligibility
of the prisoner, and any decisions of the state parole agency relating to the
prisoner. Said authorities simultaneously shall furnish all other officers and
appropriate courts in the receiving state who have lodged detainers against the
prisoner with similar certificates and with notices informing them of the
request for custody or availability and of the reasons therefor.
(c) In respect of any proceeding made possible by this article, trial shall be
commenced within one hundred twenty days of the arrival of the prisoner in
the receiving state, but for good cause shown in open court, the prisoner or his
counsel being present, the court having jurisdiction of the matter may grant
any necessary or reasonable continuance.
(d) Nothing contained in the article shall be construed to deprive any
prisoner of any right which he may have to contest the legality of his delivery
as provided in paragraph (a) hereof, but such delivery may not be opposed or
denied on the ground that the executive authority of the sending state has not
affirmatively consented to or ordered such delivery.
(e) If trial is not had on any indictment, information or complaint contemplated hereby prior to the prisoner's being returned to the original place of
imprisonment pursuant to Article V(e) hereof, such indictment, information or
complaint shall not be of any further force or effect, and the court shall enter
an order dismissing the same with prejudice.
ARTICLE V
(a) In response to a request made under Article III or Article IV hereof, the
appropriate authority in a sending state shall offer to deliver temporary
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custody of such prisoner to the appropriate authority in the state where such
indictment, information or complaint is pending against such person in order
that speedy and efficient prosecution may be had. If the request for fi^
disposition is made by the prisoner, the offer of temporary custody shall
accompany the written notice provided for in Article III of this agreement. In
the case of a federal prisoner, the appropriate authority in the receiving state
shall be entitled to temporary custody as provided by this agreement or to the
prisoner's presence in federal custody at the place for trial, whichever custodial
arrangement may be approved by the custodian.
(b) The officer or other representative of a state accepting an offer of
temporary custody shall present the following upon demand:
(1) Proper identification and evidence of his authority to act for the
state into whose temporary custody the prisoner is to be given.
(2) A duly certified copy of the indictment, information or complaint on
the basis of which the detainer has been lodged and on the basis of which
the request for temporary custody of the prisoner has been made.
(c) If the appropriate authority shall refuse or fail to accept temporary
custody of said person, or in the event that an action on the indictment,
information or complaint on the basis of which the detainer has been lodged is
not brought to trial within the period provided in Article III or Article IV
hereof, the appropriate court of the jurisdiction where the indictment, information or complaint has been pending shall enter an order dismissing the
same with prejudice, and any detainer based thereon shall cease to be of any
force or effect.
(d) The temporary custody referred to in this agreement shall be only for the
purpose of permitting prosecution on the charge or charges contained in one or
more untried indictments, informations or complaints which form the basis of
the detainer or detainers or for prosecution on any other charge or charges
arising out of the same transaction. Except for his attendance at court and
while being transported to or from any place at which his presence may be
required, the prisoner shall be held in a suitable jail or other facility regularly
used for persons awaiting prosecution.
(e) At the earliest practicable time consonant with the purposes of this
agreement, the prisoner shall be returned to the sending state.
(f) During the continuance of temporary custody or while the prisoner is
otherwise being made available for trial as required by this agreement, time
being served on the sentence shall continue to run but good time shall be
earned by the prisoner only if, and to the extent that, the law and practice of
the jurisdiction which imposed the sentence may allow.
(g) For all purposes other than that for which temporary custody as
provided in this agreement is exercised, the prisoner shall be deemed to
remain in the custody of and subject to the jurisdiction of the sending state and
any escape from temporary custody may be dealt with in the same manner as
an escape from the original place of imprisonment or in any other manner
permitted by law.
(h) From the time that a party state receives custody of a prisoner pursuant
to this agreement until such prisoner is returned to the territory and custody
of the sending state, the state in which the one or more untried indictments,
informations or complaints are pending or in which trial is being had shall be
responsible for the prisoner and shall also pay all costs of transporting, caring
for, keeping and returning the prisoner. The provisions of this paragraph shall
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govern unless the states concerned shall have entered into a supplementary
agreement providing for a different allocation of costs and responsibilities as
between or among themselves. Nothing herein contained shall be construed to
alter or affect any internal relationship among the departments, agencies and
officers of and in the government of a party state, or between a party state and
its subdivisions, as to the payment of costs, or responsibilities therefor.
ARTICLE VI
(a) In determining the duration and expiration dates of the time periods
provided in Articles III and IV of this agreement, the running of said time
periods shall be tolled whenever and for as long as the prisoner is unable to
stand trial, as determined by the court having jurisdiction of the matter.
(b) No provision of this agreement, and no remedy made available by this
agreement, shall apply to any person who is adjudged to be mentally ill.
ARTICLE VII
Each state party to this agreement shall designate an officer who, acting
jointly with like officers of other party states, shall promulgate rules and
regulations to carry out more effectively the terms and provisions of this
agreement, and who shall provide, within and without the state, information
necessary to the effective operation of this agreement.
ARTICLE VIII
This agreement shall enter into full force and effect as to a party state when
such state has enacted the same into law. A state party to this agreement may
withdraw herefrom enacting a statute repealing the same. However, the
withdrawal of any state shall not affect the status of any proceedings already
initiated by inmates or by state officers at the time such withdrawal takes
effect, nor shall it affect their rights in respect thereof.
ARTICLE DC
This agreement shall be liberally construed so as to effectuate its purposes.
The provisions of this agreement shall be severable and if any phrase, clause,
sentence or provision of this agreement is declared to be contrary to the
Constitution of any party state or of the United States or the applicability
thereof to any government, agency, person or circumstance is held invalid, the
validity of the remainder of this agreement and the applicability thereof to any
government, agency, person or circumstance shall not be affected thereby. If
this agreement shall be held contrary to the Constitution of any state party
hereto, the agreement shall remain in full force and effect as to the remaining
states and in full force and effect as to the state affected as to all severable
matters.
History: C. 1953, 77-29-5, enacted by L.
1980, ch. 15, § 2.
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